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The Northern Ireland Question: All-
Ireland Self-Determination post-Belfast 
Agreement 
 
By the Belfast Agreement of 1998, the major parties involved in the Northern Ireland 
conflict agreed that the territorial status of Northern Ireland would be determined by the 
Northern Irish people, and the people of the island of Ireland collectively. Although this 
Agreement is significant in shaping the right to self-determination in the all-Irish context, 
it contains within it many ambiguities. Many questions as to the nature, extent and effects 
of the right to self-determination in the all-Irish context still remain. These questions and 
issues which arise within the Agreement are resolvable with recourse to the customary 
international law of self-determination, particularly the law and practice relating to 
referenda. The Belfast Agreement is not simply of relevance in the Irish context. Rather, it 
has the potential to serve as a model to see the resolution of territorial and self-
determination conflicts. 
 
Key words: Northern Ireland; Belfast Agreement; Self-Determination; Referenda; 
International Law 
 
I Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 5 
II The Belfast Agreement ...................................................................................................... 6 
A Background ..................................................................................................................... 6 
B The Agreement’s Self-Determination Provisions ........................................................... 7 
C The Agreement and Politics ............................................................................................ 9 
III General Self-Determination .............................................................................................. 9 
A Scope ............................................................................................................................... 9 
B Peoples ......................................................................................................................... 11 
C Territorial Integrity ...................................................................................................... 12 
2 The Northern Ireland Question: All-Ireland Self-Determination post-Belfast Agreement 
D Referenda ...................................................................................................................... 12 
1 Good Faith ................................................................................................................ 15 
2 The Will of the People ............................................................................................... 16 
3 Peacefulness .............................................................................................................. 17 
4 Clarity ....................................................................................................................... 18 
5 Voter Eligibility ......................................................................................................... 19 
6 The Role of States ..................................................................................................... 20 
7 International Observation ......................................................................................... 20 
IV Self-Determination Post-Belfast Agreement .................................................................. 21 
A Issues ............................................................................................................................ 21 
1 Post-Conflict Society ................................................................................................. 21 
2 The Unit of Self-Determination ................................................................................. 23 
B Referendum Mechanisms .............................................................................................. 25 
1 Pre-Referendum ........................................................................................................ 25 
(a) Calling the referendum .................................................................................. 25 
(b) Amending the Constitution of Ireland ........................................................... 26 
(c) Voter eligibility ............................................................................................. 27 
(d) The required threshold ................................................................................... 28 
(e) The question .................................................................................................. 28 
2 The Referendum ........................................................................................................ 29 
(a) The role of the States ..................................................................................... 29 
(b) International observation ............................................................................... 30 
V Post-Referendum ............................................................................................................. 30 
A A United Kingdom ........................................................................................................ 31 
B A Divided Ireland ......................................................................................................... 31 
C A United Ireland ........................................................................................................... 32 
1 Statehood .................................................................................................................. 32 
2 International Organisations ..................................................................................... 32 
3 The Continuation of the Agreement .......................................................................... 33 
4 State Restructuring ................................................................................................... 34 
5 Continued UK Involvement ....................................................................................... 34 
VI The Wider Implications of the Belfast Agreement ......................................................... 36 
VII Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 37 
VIII Word Count ................................................................................................................. 39 
IX Bibliography .................................................................................................................... 40 
3 The Northern Ireland Question: All-Ireland Self-Determination post-Belfast Agreement 
A Cases and Opinions ...................................................................................................... 40 
1 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights ............................................... 40 
2 Arbitration Opinions ................................................................................................. 40 
3 Canada ...................................................................................................................... 40 
4 European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) ............ 40 
5 European Court of Human Rights ............................................................................ 40 
6 European Union ........................................................................................................ 41 
7 France ....................................................................................................................... 41 
8 International Court of Justice ................................................................................... 41 
9 Ireland ....................................................................................................................... 41 
10 South Korea .............................................................................................................. 42 
11 Spain ......................................................................................................................... 42 
12 Ukraine ..................................................................................................................... 42 
13 United Kingdom ........................................................................................................ 42 
14 United Nations Human Rights Council .................................................................... 42 
B Legislation .................................................................................................................... 42 
1 Canada ...................................................................................................................... 42 
2 Ireland ....................................................................................................................... 42 
3 Montenegro ............................................................................................................... 42 
4 United Kingdom ........................................................................................................ 42 
C Treaties ......................................................................................................................... 43 
D Books and Chapters in Books ....................................................................................... 43 
E Journal Articles ............................................................................................................ 44 
F Parliamentary and Government Materials................................................................... 45 
1 Council of Europe ..................................................................................................... 45 
2 European Union ........................................................................................................ 45 
3 Ireland ....................................................................................................................... 45 
4 Ireland and United Kingdom .................................................................................... 45 
5 North and South Korea ............................................................................................. 45 
6 United Kingdom ........................................................................................................ 45 
G United Nations Materials ............................................................................................. 46 
1 General Assembly ..................................................................................................... 46 
2 Human Rights Council .............................................................................................. 46 
3 International Law Commission ................................................................................. 46 
4 Security Council ........................................................................................................ 46 
4 The Northern Ireland Question: All-Ireland Self-Determination post-Belfast Agreement 
H Internet Sources ............................................................................................................ 46 
I Other Sources ............................................................................................................... 47 
  
5 The Northern Ireland Question: All-Ireland Self-Determination post-Belfast Agreement 
I Introduction 
Writing of the conflict known as the ‘Troubles’, which concerned the status of the six 
counties of Northern Ireland, Desmond Egan posed the “Northern Ireland Question”: “two 
wee girls/were playing tig [sic] near a car…/how many counties would you say/are worth 
their scattered fingers?”1  
Years later, but too late for the 3,600 people who were killed in the conflict between pro-
Irish ‘nationalists’ and pro-British ‘unionists’,2 these two traditions answered this question 
with a resounding “none”. By the Belfast Agreement of 1998, the use of violence for the 
furtherance of political goals was completely rejected.3 The Agreement is comprised of 
two agreements: the first being between the Northern Irish political parties (Multi-Party 
Agreement); the second being between Ireland and the United Kingdom (UK) (British-
Irish Agreement). It outlines several developments aimed at securing peace and cross-
community cooperation in Northern Ireland. Significantly, it poses an answer to another 
Northern Ireland Question: how can two opposing, yet equally legitimate, self-
determination aspirations be recognised? The answer found in the Agreement is that “it is 
for the people of the island of Ireland alone” to exercise their right to self-determination to 
create a united Ireland should they wish,4 provided that the choice “freely exercised by a 
majority of the people of Northern Ireland” as to the territory’s status would be respected.5  
Yeats’ remarks on the failed 1916 Irish Uprising, that a “terrible beauty is born”6 are an 
apt description of these provisions. Although the Agreement provided some answer to the 
                                                 
1 Desmond Egan “The Northern Ireland Question” in Terre et Paix: Poèmes d’Irlande (Presses 
Universitaires de Lille, Lille, 1988) 24 at 24 (translation: Earth and Peace: Poems of Ireland). 
2 David McKittrick and David McVea Making Sense of the Troubles: A History of the Northern Ireland 
Conflict (Viking, London, 2012) at 377. 
3 Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the 
Government of Ireland 2114 UNTS 474 (signed 10 April 1998, entered into force 2 December 1999) 
[British-Irish Agreement] (annex I) Agreement Reached in the Multi-Party Negotiations [Multi-Party 
Agreement] at 478 (note: page numbers refer to the pages in the UNTS annex). 
4 British-Irish Agreement, art 1(ii); Multi-Party Agreement at 479. 
5 British-Irish Agreement, art 1(i); Multi-Party Agreement at 479. 
6 WB Yeats “Easter 1916” in Augustine Martin (ed) Vintage Yeats: Collected Poems (Vintage Books, 
London, 1992) 176 at 176, 177 and 178. 
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Northern Ireland Question, much remains ambiguous.7 Little academic commentary on 
these provisions exists.8 This essay, therefore, shall seek an answer to the question as to 
the nature, extent and effects of self-determination in post-Agreement Ireland. Seeking this 
answer requires an examination of the general law of self-determination; how this can 
resolve ambiguities within the Agreement; and the effects of the Agreement’s self-
determination provisions, both in Ireland and more broadly. 
II The Belfast Agreement  
A Background 
The Agreement was a peace agreement to bring an end to the conflict known as the 
‘Troubles’.9 Although the conflict had complex routes, it was, at its core, a conflict of 
status,10 sparked by an Irish civil rights movement.11 Northern Ireland was, and is, part of 
the UK, and contains within it two communities divided by ethnicity, culture, religion and 
politics. The majority of the population are ‘unionist’.12 Traditionally of Protestant 
denomination, unionists identify as British and support Northern Ireland remaining part of 
the UK.13 Nationalists, on the other hand, form an increasingly growing minority.14 
Traditionally Catholic and of Irish identity, nationalists support the creation of a united 
Ireland.15 
The Troubles occurred between 1969 and 1998, and resulted in over 3,600 deaths.16 The 
British armed forces were deployed. Unionist and nationalist paramilitaries committed acts 
                                                 
7 Christine Bell and Kathleen Cavanaugh “‘Constructive Ambiguity’ or Internal Self-Determination? Self-
Determination, Group Accommodation, and the Belfast Agreement” (1998) 22 Fordham Int’l LJ 1345. 
8 Amy Maguire “Self-Determination, Justice, and a ‘Peace Process’: Irish Nationalism, the Contemporary 
Colonial Experience and the Good Friday Agreement” (2014) 13 Seattle J for Soc Just 537 at 563.  
9 McKittrick and McVea, above n 2, at 255–256. 
10 At 1–2. 
11 Rainer Grote “Northern Ireland” in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed) The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) vol 7 816 at [13]. 
12 McKittrick and McVea, above n 2, at 1. 
13 At 1. 
14 David Young “Protestant-Catholic gap narrows as census results revealed” (11 December 2012) Belfast 
Telegraph <www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk>. 
15 McKittrick and McVea, above n 2, at 1–2. 
16 At 377. 
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of violence to push their agendas. Human rights violations were also committed by both 
the UK and Ireland.17 
Peace processes began in the 1990s, resulting in the Belfast Agreement.18 The Agreement 
contains provisions on justice, human rights, governance and cross-border institutions. In 
contrast to the self-determination provisions, these have been analysed extensively.19  
The Agreement was reached not simply through State negotiations, but largely by the 
major Northern Irish nationalist and unionist political parties.20 As previous conflict 
resolution attempts had largely excluded these groups,21 this itself was a major 
development. The Agreement was accepted by the populations of both Ireland and 
Northern Ireland by referendum.22 
B The Agreement’s Self-Determination Provisions 
The self-determination provisions are contained in both the British-Irish Agreement and 
the Multi-Party Agreement. The provisions therefore represent not only an inter-State 
consensus, but also a social and political consensus, between the peoples of Northern 
Ireland. 
The Agreement acknowledges the legitimacy “of whatever choice is freely exercised by a 
majority of people of Northern Ireland” regarding the retention of ties with Britain or the 
formation of united Ireland,23 and states that to change Northern Ireland’s status other than 
                                                 
17 See for example Peter Smithwick Report of the Tribunal of Inquiry into Suggestions that Members of An 
Garda Síochána or other Employees of the State colluded in the Fatal Shooting of RUC Chief 
Superintendent Harry Breen and RUC Superintendent Robert Buchanan on the 20th March 1989 
(Government of Ireland Stationery Office, Dublin, 2013); Lord Saville, William Hoyt and John Toohey 
Report of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry (Stationery Office, London, 2010); Brice Dickson The European 
Convention on Human Rights and the Conflict in Northern Ireland (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010). 
18 McKittrick and McVea, above n 2, at 255–256. 
19 See for example Austen Morgan The Belfast Agreement: A practical legal analysis (The Belfast Press, 
London, 2000). 
20 At [1.18]. 
21 Bernadette C Hayes and Ian McAllister “Who Voted for Peace? Public Support for the 1998 Northern 
Ireland Agreement” (2001) 16 Irish Political Studies 73 at 73. 
22 At 79. 
23 British-Irish Agreement, art 1(i); Multi-Party Agreement at 479. 
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by majority consent would be “wrong”.24 The Agreement further states that “it is for the 
people of the island of Ireland alone, by agreement between the two parts respectively and 
without external impediment” to bring about a united Ireland should they wish.25 
Therefore, the consent of the population in both jurisdictions on the island is a prerequisite 
to the formation of a united Ireland. Should the “people of the island of Ireland” wish to 
create a united Ireland, both Ireland and the UK are bound by this wish.26  
Regardless of Northern Ireland’s status, government there must be “exercised with 
rigorous impartiality”,27 and the “birthright of all the people of Northern Ireland” to Irish 
and British identity and citizenship is affirmed.28 
The means by which the wishes of the people are to be obtained cannot be properly 
assessed without reference to the Northern Ireland Act 1998 (UK), which states that this is 
to be assessed by a poll, or referendum.29 Limited additional guidance as to the poll’s 
nature is given.30 
Whilst there are no present plans to hold a referendum, four factors indicate that the 
holding of one is not unlikely in the future. First, following the recent self-determination 
referendum in Scotland, nationalists have called for a referendum on the North’s status.31 
Second, the centenary of the 1916 Irish Uprising, which set into motion the events leading 
to Irish independence, is approaching, creating a climate of increased nationalistic pride 
amongst parts of the population.32 Third, although the traditionally nationalist Catholics 
within Northern Ireland remain a minority, the population gap between Protestants and 
                                                 
24 British-Irish Agreement, art 1(iii); Multi-Party Agreement at 479. 
25 British-Irish Agreement, art 1(ii); Multi-Party Agreement at 479. 
26 British-Irish Agreement, art 1(iv); Multi-Party Agreement at 479. 
27 British-Irish Agreement, art 1(v); Multi-Party Agreement at 479. 
28 British-Irish Agreement, art 1(vi); Multi-Party Agreement at 479. 
29 Northern Ireland Act 1998 (UK), s 1(2). 
30 Schedule 1. 
31 Martin McGuinness “McGuinness calls for border poll” (19 September 2014) Sinn Féin 
<www.sinnfein.ie>; “Scottish referendum: Sinn Féin’s Martin McGuinness calls for Northern Ireland border 
poll following Scotland result” (19 September 2014) Belfast Telegraph <www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk>. 
32 Ruth Dudley Edwards “Still obediently following Fenian instruction booklet: Gerry Adams wants to put 
the 1981 hunger strikers on a par with the men of 1916” (30 August 2015) Belfast Telegraph 
<www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk>. 
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Catholics is rapidly decreasing.33 Fourth, the UK government has shown its willingness to 
permit self-determination referenda, as shown in Scotland. Taken together, these factors 
suggest that discourse surrounding self-determination and the Agreement will become 
increasingly important. In such discourse, the resolution of the Agreement’s ambiguities 
will be crucial.  
C The Agreement and Politics 
The lack of precision within the self-determination provisions is unsurprising. Law is 
inherently political, especially where minority rights34 and self-determination35 are 
concerned. Such is true of the entire Belfast Agreement,36 in particular its self-
determination provisions.37 However, despite the Agreement’s political nature38 it is a 
legally binding treaty between the UK and Ireland. Ambiguities must therefore be resolved 
by the law, not politics.39 Although much has been written on the political desirability of 
the Agreement,40 these issues are legally irrelevant. What is relevant is how the 
Agreement’s provisions can be interpreted and implemented in light of legal principles,41 
particularly the general law of self-determination. 
III General Self-Determination 
A Scope  
Self-determination concerns the right of people “freely to determine, without external 
interference, their political status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural 
                                                 
33 Young, above n 14. 
34 Reference re Manitoba Language Rights [1985] 1 SCR 721 (Can) at 728. 
35 Reference re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 SCR 217 (Can) at [1]. 
36 Doherty v Governor of Portlaoise Prison [2002] 2 IR 252 (SC) at 254 per Keane CJ; Re Northern Ireland 
Human Rights Commission [2002] NI 236 (HL) at [66] per Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough dissenting. 
37 Bell and Cavanaugh, above n 7, at 1335. 
38 Doherty, above n 36, at 254 per Keane CJ; Re Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, above n 36, at 
[66] per Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough dissenting. 
39 Morgan, above n 19, at [1.27]. 
40 See for example Gerry Adams “To Cherish a Just and Lasting Peace” (1998) 22 Fordham Int’l LJ 1179; 
Ian Paisley “Peace Agreement — Or Last Piece in a Sellout Agreement?” (1998) 22 Fordham Int’l LJ 1273. 
41 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1155 UNTS 331 (opened for signature 23 May 1969, entered 
into force 27 January 1980), art 31. 
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development”.42 This “requires a free and genuine expression of the will of the peoples 
concerned”.43 Self-determination is a fundamental, erga omnes, legal principle.44  
Self-determination has internal and external aspects.45 Internally, it concerns the pursuit of 
political goals within an existing State.46 The State’s population has the right to determine 
its own destiny and to choose representative government.47 Distinct groups have the right 
to participation in the State’s political life, representation in its government and to non-
discrimination.48  
External self-determination concerns a territory leaving a State.49 This right arises in 
limited circumstances. It is applicable to trust territories50 and non-self-governing 
territories “whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government”.51 
Outside these contexts, its application remains unclear,52 although the scope of its 
application is widening. It has been applied in the context of State dissolution53 and 
                                                 
42 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among 
States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations GA Res 2625, XXV (1970) [Friendly Relations 
Declaration], principle 5. 
43 Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion) [1975] ICJ Rep 12 at [55]. 
44 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 993 UNTS 3 (opened for signature 16 
December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976), art 1(1); International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights 999 UNTS 171 (opened for signature 16 December 1996, entered into force 26 March 1976), art 1(1); 
East Timor (Portugal v Australia) (Judgment) [1995] ICJ Rep 90 at [29]. 
45 John Dugard “The Secession of States and Their Recognition in the Wake of Kosovo” (2011) 357 Recueil 
des Cours 9 at 85–86. 
46 Reference re Quebec, above n 35, at [126]. 
47 Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo 
(Advisory Opinion) [2010] ICJ Rep 403 at 621, [9] per Judge Yusuf (separate opinion). 
48 At 621, [9] per Judge Yusuf (separate opinion). 
49 Reference re Quebec, above n 35, at [126]. 
50 Charter of the United Nations, ch XII; James Crawford The Creation of States in International Law (2nd 
ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006) at 116. 
51 Charter of the United Nations, art 73; Crawford, above n 50, at 116. 
52 Daniel Thürer and Thomas Burri “Self-Determination” in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed) The Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) vol 9 113 at [34]; 
Opinion No 2 (1992) 92 ILR 167 (Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission) at 168. 
53 Thürer and Burri, above n 52, at [34]; Opinion No 2, above n 52, at 168–169. 
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occupation.54 Furthermore, it has also been argued that a right of ‘remedial secession’ may 
exist in some circumstances. The Friendly Relations Declaration of 1970 states that self-
determination cannot authorise any action which impairs the unity of “States conducting 
themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of 
peoples”.55 This apparent proviso has been controversially interpreted as permitting a 
people to secede from a State which grossly violates their self-determination rights.56 For 
present purposes, the relevance of this controversy is that it highlights the contestable 
nature of self-determination.  
Of course, self-determination is applicable where a State willingly adopts it to resolve a 
particular dispute,57 which is what the Belfast Agreement does in terms.58 
B Peoples 
The right to self-determination attaches to ‘people’.59 However, the definition of people 
remains unclear.60 Such uncertainties have led to self-determination being described as 
“ridiculous because the people cannot decide until somebody decides who are the 
people.”61 
                                                 
54 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory 
Opinion) [2004] ICJ Rep 136 at [118]. 
55 Friendly Relations Declaration, above n 42, principle 5. 
56 Kosovo (Advisory Opinion), above n 47, at 622, [11] per Judge Yusuf (separate opinion); Dugard, above n 
45, at 117. 
57 Crawford, above n 50, at 117. 
58 British-Irish Agreement, art 1(ii); Multi-Party Agreement at 479. 
59 See for example Charter of the United Nations, art 1(2); International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, art 1(1); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art 1(1); Friendly Relations 
Declaration, above n 42, principle 5. 
60 Hilary Charlesworth “Democracy and International Law” (2014) 371 Recueil des Cours 42 at 84; Anne 
Peters “The Crimean Vote of March 2014 as an Abuse of the Institution of the Territorial Referendum” in 
Christian Calliess (ed) Herausforderungen an Staat und Verfassung: Völkerrecht - Europarecht - 
Menschenrechte: Liber Amicorum für Torsten Stein zum 70 Geburtstag (Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2015) 278 at 
281 (translation: Challenges to State and Constitution: International Law – European Law – Human Rights: 
Liber Amicorum for Torsten Stein’s 70th Birthday); Crawford, above n 50, at 120–121. 
61 Ivor Jennings The Approach to Self-Government (Beacon Press, Boston, 1956) at 56. 
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Despite this, there are several accepted indicia of a people. A group classified as a people 
will generally share common elements, such as language,62 culture,63 ethnic identity64 and 
ideology.65 Minority groups are not precluded from the definition, 66 although people 
generally form a majority within a distinct territory.67 More than one people may exist 
within a territory.68 As they “are the masters of the country”,69 and have the right to 
determine the status of destiny of the territory,70 the determination of whether a group 
amounts to a people is crucial.  
C Territorial Integrity 
States who act in accordance with, and respect the right to, internal self-determination are 
entitled to the protection of their territorial integrity.71 Territorial integrity limits external 
self-determination, as a general right of secession “would reduce to naught the territorial 
sovereignty and integrity of States and would lead to interminable conflicts and chaos in 
international relations.”72 
D Referenda 
The will of the people is best established through referenda.73 As was observed by the 
French Conseil Constitutional, the result of a referendum constitutes a direct expression of 
                                                 
62 Reference re Quebec, above n 35, at [125]. 
63 At [125]. 
64 Gunme v Cameroon [2009] AHRLR 9 (ACHPR) at [170]. 
65 At [170]. 
66 Kosovo (Advisory Opinion), above n 47, at 621, at [9] per Judge Yusuf (separate opinion); Crawford, 
above n 50, at 121. 
67 Dugard, above n 45, at 91–92; Gunme, above n 64, at para 170. 
68 Dugard, above n 45, at 97; Reference re Quebec, above n 35, at [124]; Kosovo (Advisory Opinion), above 
n 47, at [109]. 
69 Kim Dae-jung (President, Republic of Korea) and Kim Jong-il (Chairman, Democratic People’s Republic 
of Korea) South-North Joint Declaration (2000) at [1]. 
70 Western Sahara, above n 43, at 114 per Judge Dillard (separate opinion). 
71 Reference re Quebec, above n 35, at [130]. 
72 Kosovo (Advisory Opinion), above n 47, at 622, [9] per Judge Yusuf (separate opinion). 
73 Antonio Cassese Self-determination of peoples: A legal reappraisal (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1995) at 213; Jure Vidmar “The Scottish Independence Referendum in an International Context” 
(2013) 51 Can YB Int’l L 259 at 261–262; Peters, above n 60, at 286. 
13 The Northern Ireland Question: All-Ireland Self-Determination post-Belfast Agreement 
national sovereignty.74 In the Irish context, a referendum is required before any change in 
Northern Ireland’s status will be lawful.75  
In this regard, the Belfast Agreement is not unique. Numerous referenda have been 
employed internationally, and customary international law now requires a referendum 
before any territorial change is lawful.76 
However, even if referendum results favour secession, this does not give rise to 
independence as a right.77 Rather, such results trigger an obligation to enter into 
negotiations to discuss the future status of the territory, whether that be independence or 
otherwise.78 The exception to this rule, which applies explicitly under the Belfast 
Agreement,79 is where a State commits to allowing independence prior to the holding of 
the referendum, and is therefore bound to honour this.80 
From the numerous referenda which have taken place, numerous principles as to their 
conduct have emerged. Rather than being merely good practice, these are principles of 
customary international law.81 The existence of a customary rule is demonstrated by 
general State practice, which is accepted as law,82 and can be established by academic 
                                                 
74 Décision n° 62-20 DC [1962] Recueil 27 (Fr Conseil Constitutionnel) at [2] (translation: Decision n° 62-
20 DC). 
75 Northern Ireland Act, s 1. 
76 Peters, above n 60, at 288; İlker Gökhan Şen Sovereignty Referendums in International and Constitutional 
Law (Springer, Heidelberg, 2015) at 85. 
77 Vidmar, above n 73, at 259; Víctor Ferreres Comella “The Spanish Constitutional Court Confronts 
Catalonia’s ‘Right to Decide’ (Comment on the Judgment 42/2014)” (2014) 10 EuConst 571 at 580–581; 
Sentencia 42/2014 (2014) 87 Boletín Oficial del Estado 77 (Esp Tribunal Constitucional) at 95 (translation: 
Judgment 42/2014). 
78 Reference re Quebec, above n 35, at [91]; Sentencia 42/2014, above n 77, at 98; Vidmar, above n 73, at 
263. 
79 British-Irish Agreement, art 1(iv); Multi-Party Agreement at 479. 
80 Vidmar, above n 73, at 263. 
81 Sarah Wambaugh “La Pratique des Plébiscites Internationaux” (1927) 18 Recueil des Cours 149 at 232 
(translation: “The Practice of International Plebiscites”). 
82 International Law Commission Identification of customary international law: Text of the draft conclusions 
provisionally adopted by the Drafting Committee A/CN.4/L.869 (2015), draft conclusion 2; North Sea 
Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany v Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany v Netherlands) 
(Judgment) [1969] ICJ Rep 3 at [77]. 
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opinion as a subsidiary means.83 In the specific context of referenda, three points also 
serve to support the argument that the principles discussed below are custom,  
First, as self-determination is customary international law,84 the rules of referenda must 
also be custom. To suggest otherwise would undermine the logical application of self-
determination. Self-determination requires a genuine expression of the people’s will,85 and 
this is best determined through referenda.86 As the principles relating to referenda, like 
self-determination as a whole, are aimed at ensuring the will of the people is freely and 
genuinely expressed, they form a subset of the law of self-determination.87 As a matter of 
logic, the principles must be customary law, too.  
Second, analogies may be drawn to international human rights law. Established human 
rights law requires free and genuine elections.88 Such elections are at the foundation of the 
democratic system,89 and are crucial for establishing and maintaining legal, democratic 
regimes.90 These underlying rationales apply equally in the context of referenda, such that 
human rights bodies have not hesitated to apply electoral human rights in referendum 
contexts.91 This cross-applicability also has scholarly support.92 Due to this cross-
applicability with the established legal principles of election rights, the principles of 
referenda are also principles of law. 
                                                 
83 Identification of customary international law, above n 82, draft conclusion 14. 
84 East Timor, above n 44, at [29]. 
85 Western Sahara, above n 43, at [55]. 
86 Cassese, above n 73, at 213; Vidmar, above n 73, at 261–262; Peters, above n 60, at 286. 
87 Peters, above n 60, at 288; Şen, above n 76, at 85. 
88 Universal Declaration of Human Rights GA Res 217(III)A, III (1948), art 21(3); Protocol to the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 213 UNTS 262 (opened for 
signature 20 March 1952, entered into force 18 May 1954), art 3; International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, art 25. 
89 Oran v Turkey (28881/07) Section II, ECHR 15 April 2014 at [51]. 
90 Dicle et Sadak c Turquie (48621/07) Section II, ECHR 16 June 2015 at [76] (translation: Dicle and Sadak 
v Turkey). 
91 Human Rights Council General Comment 25 CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.7 (1996) at [6]; Gillot v France 
UNHRC CCPR/C/75/D/932/2000, 21 July 2002 at [12.2]. 
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Third, the Venice Commission, a Council of Europe body, released a Code of Good 
Practice on Referendums,93 and the principles outlined below are mostly contained within 
it. Whilst this cannot establish custom of itself, the Code was readily adopted by the 
Member States of the Council of Europe,94 this being a significant piece of practice. 
With these general propositions in mind, State practice establishes that the following 
norms are principles of customary international law which will be relevant in a referendum 
under the Agreement. 
1 Good Faith 
That ambiguities in the Agreement must be interpreted in good faith is uncontroversial, as 
all treaties must be so interpreted.95 The good faith rule has also been explicitly applied in 
a referendum context.96  
Good faith obligations require the resolution of differences by negotiations.97 When the 
General Assembly condemned Crimea’s 2014 referendum as unlawful,98 it called on 
parties to enter into “direct political dialogue” to resolve the dispute as to Crimea’s 
status.99 This obligation was also reflected in the debate leading to the resolution’s 
adoption,100 and in a draft Security Council resolution.101 
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2 The Will of the People 
It is a fundamental rule of customary international law that self-determination referenda 
permit the free expression of the will of the people.102 The Irish Chief Justice, in the 
context of a municipal referendum, aptly stated that the people’s will expressed in a 
referendum “is sacrosanct and if freely give, cannot be interfered with. The decision is 
[theirs] and [theirs] alone.”103 Even in what is perhaps the earliest treaty envisaging a 
referendum in the context of territorial reunification, it was stated that the reunification 
was to take place without constraining the population’s will.104  
The customary nature of this norm is clear. Following the dissolution of the Former 
Yugoslavia, recognition of Bosnia-Hercegovina was declined in the absence of a free 
referendum on independence.105 Further evidence of the norm’s legal status is found in the 
Crimean context. Although much criticism was directed at the Crimean referendum’s 
municipal unlawfulness,106 States were more concerned with the fact that the referendum 
was conducted in a manner so as not to establish the free will of the people. The European 
Union’s (EU) refusal to recognise the referendum as lawful stemmed from its failure to 
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adhere to “democratic standards of free expression and free will”,107 a position also echoed 
by other States before the Security Council and General Assembly.108 
Significantly, Russia’s conduct in relation to Crimea also provides evidence of the binding 
nature of the norm. Rather than argue that the territory could be transferred without freely 
given consent, the Russian delegation argued that the referendum permitted the people of 
Crimea to express their free will,109 and that the referendum was undertaken in “strict 
compliance with international law and democratic procedure, without outside interference 
and through a free referendum”.110 The fact that Russia refuted allegations of a breach of 
law by attempting to use the law to justify the referendum’s legality only serves to 
emphasise the customary nature of the rule.111 
3 Peacefulness 
The Crimean referendum also highlights the requirement that the territory be at peace at 
the time of a self-determination referendum.112 Again, part of the rationale for the 
international community’s refusal to recognise the referendum’s results was the presence 
of military forces in the region.113 The reason for this norm is that where armed forces, 
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whether government or otherwise, are present in the territory, some degree of undue 
influence over voters is inherent, meaning the expression of the people’s will may not be 
free and genuine.114 The requirement of a territory being at peace at the time of a 
referendum is also borne out in practice relating to other referenda115 and academic 
opinion.116 
4 Clarity 
The requirement of clarity is twofold. First, the question asked must be as clear as 
possible,117 and free from ambiguity.118 It must allow the retention of the status quo as an 
option. The international illegality of Crimea’s secession also stems from the referendum 
question’s failure in this regard.119 Likewise, State practice in other contexts also indicates 
that a clear question is crucial for the establishment of the genuine will of the people.120 
Similarly, only one question should be posed in a single ballot paper in order to increase 
clarity.121 
Examples of clear questions can be found in relation to Montenegro and Scotland. In the 
Montenegro independence referendum of 2006, voters were asked “Do you want the 
Republic of Montenegro to be an independent state with full international and legal 
personality?”122 The question asked of Scottish voters was “exemplary in its clarity”,123 
with voters asked “Should Scotland be an independent country?”124  
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Second, the turnout and majority thresholds must be clear. Although the Venice 
Commission has advised against the imposition of a turnout thresholds or thresholds of 
more than a simple majority of votes,125 State practice indicates that such thresholds are 
permissible.126 There is no universally prescribed threshold in law. Rather, there is a 
general requirement of a clear and unambiguous majority.127 In this regard, Canadian State 
practice helpfully states that the determination of whether a majority is “clear” shall be 
considered with regard to the size of the majority,128 the percentage of eligible voters 
partaking,129 and any other matters which are relevant.130 The difficulty with applying this 
to Northern Ireland will be that the Irish referendum is binding, whereas those envisaged in 
Canadian practice are not.131 
5 Voter Eligibility 
Although universal suffrage is the most appropriate solution to voter eligibility in the 
context of referenda,132 restrictions placed upon eligibility, particularly on the basis of a 
residential period, are not unlawful.133 Any restrictions on the electoral rights must not be 
discriminatory or unreasonable,134 and must take account of local requirements and 
circumstances.135 In order to lawfully restrict voting rights, States must have a legitimate 
aim.136  
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6 The Role of States 
States should take a minimum role in referenda, in that they should not promote one 
agenda to the exclusion of another.137 Although States can support one side of a 
proposition, such intervention cannot result in excessive, one-sided campaigning.138 States 
remain obliged to inform voters of the effects of the various outcomes available.139 The 
rationale underpinning this is that although law and politics are often intertwined,140 
referenda themselves should not be used as a “political weapon” by the State.141 
Notably, both Irish and UK municipal law support this proposition. Under Irish law, the 
government is restricted, on the basis of equality, from providing a particular side of the 
issue with public funding.142 There is also authority from the UK to the same effect.143 
7 International Observation 
International observation is crucial to ensure that the international community will accept 
the result of a referendum. 144 It was called for as a condition of a referendum in the 
context of Bosnia-Hercegovina, so that the free will of the peoples could be properly 
obtained.145 Particularly in the context of a post-conflict society, international scrutiny 
adds to the legitimacy of the outcome of any referendum.146 As with many of the other 
principles discussed thus far, part of the international rationale for the unlawfulness of the 
Crimean referendum was the lack of international observation of it.147 
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IV Self-Determination Post-Belfast Agreement 
Thus far, the self-determination provisions of the Agreement have been outlined, as have 
key principles of the law of self-determination which will impact the exercise of the right 
under the Agreement. In combining these two sets of legal principles, the nature, extent 
and effects of self-determination in the all-Irish context can be established. In order to 
establish the nature of this right to self-determination, issues with the Belfast Agreement, 
and the mechanisms of the referendum under it, call for exploration. 
A Issues  
1 Post-Conflict Society 
Northern Ireland is in a post-conflict period. This will present difficulties in the context of 
self-determination. The conflict was one of status,148 and where in the global order 
Northern Ireland properly belonged. Although the Agreement contained provisions on the 
decommissioning of paramilitary organisations, and completely rejected the use of 
violence in all circumstances, sectarian violence has continued.149 Tensions remain,150 and 
unless peace and reconciliation measures are implemented, there remains a risk that the 
territory will enter into a state of conflict once more.151 
Although any suggestion that Northern Ireland will enter into conflict again is speculative, 
it must be appreciated that this is a genuine risk, as evidenced be recent events. Following 
the emergence of evidence suggesting the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) had 
not fully decommissioned, the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) accused Sinn Féin of being 
involved in the PIRA’s continued existence.152 Sinn Féin denied this,153 and accused the 
                                                 
148 McKittrick and McVea, above n 2, at 1–2. 
149 William A Schabas and Peter G Fitzmaurice Respect, Protect and Fulfil: A Human Rights-Based 
Approach to Peacebuilding and Reconciliation (Border Action, Monaghan, 2007) at 12. 
150 At 12. 
151 At 13. 
152 Mike Nesbitt “Statement by Ulster Unionist Party Leader” (26 August 2015) Ulster Unionist Party 
<uup.org>; Tom Elliott and Danny Kinahan “Ulster Unionist MPs call on the Secretary of State to make 
statement in Parliament on status of PIRA” (27 August 2015) Ulster Unionist Party <uup.org>. 
153 Jonathan Bell “UUP to walk out of Northern Ireland Executive after ruling body endorses Mike Nesbitt 
proposal” (29 August 2015) <www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk>. 
22 The Northern Ireland Question: All-Ireland Self-Determination post-Belfast Agreement 
UUP of undermining the Agreement.154 Further, the UUP has announced its intention to 
withdraw from the Northern Ireland Assembly, an institution set up by the Belfast 
Agreement.155 This latest series of events highlights the fragility of peace in Northern 
Ireland. The ramifications of this series of events, particularly the UUP’s withdrawal of 
support for an institute created by the Agreement, cannot yet be known. However, these 
recent events are concerning, and highlight the need for increased measures aimed at 
building and ensuring peace. 
Given that the Troubles was a conflict concerning Northern Ireland’s status, a referendum 
on this issue may trigger underlying tensions. A referendum in Northern Ireland would 
differ from most post-conflict referenda, wherein there is often an overwhelming majority 
in support of independence, or some form of constitutional collapse which makes 
secession the only viable option. 156 Likewise, Northern Ireland is contextually different 
from referenda in Scotland and Quebec, wherein the same background of sectarian conflict 
was absent.157 There are, therefore, few useful precedents in addressing how to deal with 
the implementation of a self-determination referendum in a post-conflict society wherein 
the majority are not clearly in favour of secession.  
To ensure that any future referendum is undertaken in peaceful conditions, as required by 
law,158 it is crucial that measures are implemented in Northern Ireland to deal with the 
past. Not only is this crucial in a referendum context, but the resolving of these issues will 
go some way to ensuring a just and lasting peace, regardless of Northern Ireland’s status. 
The failure of the UK government to prioritise addressing the past has drawn criticism 
from human rights proponents,159 who have called for the establishment of appropriate 
mechanisms for addressing the past,160 protecting human rights,161 building peace,162 and 
encouraging reconciliation.163  
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The implementation of appropriate mechanisms to deal with the controversies of the past is 
therefore crucial, not only in the context of self-determination, but to ensure a lasting 
peace. Contrary to recently expressed opinion that peace and reconciliation processes 
cannot occur “while Britain continues to occupy even one square [millimetre] of 
Ireland”,164 peace and reconciliation are not dependent on a united Ireland, they are a 
prerequisite to it. To suggest that such processes cannot occur if Northern Ireland remains 
a part of the UK is irrational, particularly given the fact that there is no guarantee of the 
creation of a united Ireland, and given the fundamental obligation of States to ensure that 
their citizens live in peace. In implementing measures for adequately dealing with the past, 
the two governments will not only make significant progress to ensuring lasting peace, but, 
should the circumstances arise where a self-determination referendum is to occur, they will 
have gone a significant way to creating conditions wherein it can be undertaken in more 
just, equitable and peaceful conditions, regardless of the outcome. 
2 The Unit of Self-Determination 
The identification of the self-determination unit in the present case is a matter of great 
importance. Although the “people of the island of Ireland alone” have the right to bring 
about a united Ireland,165 this cannot happen without the consent of the “people of 
Northern Ireland”.166  
The “people of the island of Ireland alone” will include a population which is 
overwhelmingly in support of a united Ireland, as it includes persons from the Republic of 
Ireland. In recognising that the “people of the island of Ireland” may collectively bring 
about a united Ireland, the Agreement vests the right of external self-determination in this 
unit. The right to self-determination of people of the island of Ireland, however, is not 
absolute. Rather, it is inherently tied to the right of another self-determination unit, the 
people of Northern Ireland. Indeed, there will be cross-over between these two groups: a 
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person who is a person of Northern Ireland will also be a person of the island of Ireland, 
although the converse will not always be true. 
In this regard, the Belfast Agreement differs from the general law of self-determination. In 
the context of external self-determination in the all-Irish context, the provisions of the 
Belfast Agreement with regards to who constitutes a self-determination unit are lex 
specialis provisions – that is to say that by their specificity, they take precedence over the 
general law of self-determination.167 This means that in the Irish context, the right to 
external self-determination does not vest in nationalists or unionists per se. Rather it 
invests in them as a collective. 
That said, the fact that the nationalist and unionist populations both have characteristics of 
a people in their own right168 per the customary international legal definition169 is 
significant. Although the Agreement’s provisions are lex specialis with regards to external 
self-determination, customary international law will remain relevant for matters that are 
not covered by it.170 The Agreement’s provisions relate only to external self-
determination. Therefore, for the purposes of the internal right to self-determination, the 
nationalist and unionist populations still constitute different peoples, as they would in 
customary international law. 
The point is not of mere academic interest. As the right of internal self-determination 
grants a right to peoples to take an active part in the political life of the State and to be free 
from discrimination,171 this means that unionists and nationalists, in their own right rather 
than as collective, must be granted these rights internally regardless of the status of 
Northern Ireland. 
The right of self-determination in the Irish context, therefore, operates in two ways. The 
first means by which the right operates is externally. The people of the island of Ireland are 
entitled to form a united Ireland as a unit of self-determination, subject to the requirement 
that a majority of the people of Northern Ireland, being a subset of the people of the island 
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of Ireland, also share this wish. The second mechanism of operation is internal self-
determination. Rather than attaching to the people of the island of Ireland, or Northern 
Ireland, it attaches to the nationalist and unionist populations. As such, although 
nationalists and unionists are entitled to customary legal protection of their right to internal 
self-determination, the right to external self-determination is vested in the people of 
Ireland and Northern Ireland, and is not delineated on the basis of traditional customary 
international law divisions. 
B Referendum Mechanisms 
The nature and extent of the right to self-determination under the Belfast Agreement can 
only be properly understood by examining the mechanisms of the referendum envisaged in 
the Agreement. The Agreement is largely silent on the mechanisms of the envisaged 
referendum. However, by reference to customary international law, a fuller understanding 
of the referendum processes can be established.  
1 Pre-Referendum 
(a) Calling the referendum 
The British-Irish Agreement itself is silent on when a referendum is to be held. This matter 
is provided for in the Northern Ireland Act, which implemented the Agreement into the 
UK’s municipal law. The Act states that Northern Ireland is a part of the UK, and shall 
remain so unless a “poll” indicates that the majority of the people of Northern Ireland do 
not wish for it to remain so.172 Such a poll, or referendum, is to be called by the Secretary 
of State. It may be called at any time,173 but must be done if it appears “likely” that a 
majority of Northern Irish voters would vote in favour of a united Ireland.174 As the Act 
implements the Belfast Agreement, the failure to call a referendum where it appears likely 
that a vote in favour of a united Ireland would result would be an internationally wrongful 
act for which State responsibility could be invoked, and an action for which remedies in 
judicial review would lie.175 Should a referendum be called, and lead to a vote in favour of 
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retaining Northern Ireland’s current status, another self-determination cannot be called 
until the passing of seven years.176 
Neither the Act nor the Agreement contain an express obligation for the UK to consult 
with Ireland before calling a referendum. To not do so, however, would be unlawful. The 
Agreement requires that consent to form a united Ireland be “freely and concurrently 
given” on both sides of the border.177 The implication of this is that the referendum must 
be held at the same time in both parts of Ireland. Given this, and the good faith obligations 
on the parties,178 before the statutory power to call a referendum is exercised, negotiations 
with the Irish government must take place. 
(b) Amending the Constitution of Ireland 
Prior to the referendum, amendment to Irish constitutional law may be required. Any law 
which is inconsistent with the Irish constitution is invalid.179 This may present difficulties 
in relation to the implementation of the Belfast Agreement in a united Ireland. Although 
the present study has focused mainly on the implementation of the Agreement’s self-
determination provisions, many other issues are addressed in the Agreement. Significantly, 
the Multi-Party Agreement contains provisions on an agreed, devolved governmental 
structure for Northern Ireland.180 If, as it will be argued in section V, the Belfast 
Agreement would continue in force should a united Ireland be created, Ireland must allow 
regional government in Northern Ireland on these terms. Such a change will require 
change to the Irish constitution, which itself is only amendable by referendum.181 This 
means that the changes to the constitution necessary to enable the continuation of the 
Northern Ireland government will need to be made either at the time of the self-
determination referendum, or beforehand.  
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To do so beforehand is preferable, as it means the terms on which the Northern Irish 
people would be accepted into a united Ireland would be made fully known to them.182 
This is in keeping with the State’s obligation to ensure that voters are fully informed of the 
implication of the referendum results.183 Furthermore, to change the constitution at the 
time of a self-determination referendum would be contrary to best practice, as it would 
mean that voters would be voting on multiple issues in one referendum,184 and the 
requirement of clarity would be greatly undermined. As the Irish parliament is not 
competent to legislate in respect of Northern Ireland,185 these amendments would have to 
be done on the basis that they would have no force unless Northern Ireland were to 
become a part of a united Ireland. 
(c) Voter eligibility 
With regards to voter eligibility, only restrictions with a valid reason may be placed on the 
right to vote.186 Particularly, residency requirements would be both lawful187 and 
advisable. The right to self-determination is not vested in the inhabitants of the island of 
Ireland, but in the people.188 The implication of this is that those who are entitled to vote 
are those who can demonstrate a permanent connection with the island of Ireland, not 
merely presence there, or even British or Irish citizenship. As such, imposing a restriction 
so that persons who are eligible to vote are only those who have resided on the island of 
Ireland for a time agreed by both States is a legitimate objective, so as to protect the 
interests of the identified self-determination units.  
Even within the island of Ireland, restrictions on voter eligibility on the basis of residency 
will mitigate the risk, however marginal it may be, that the Northern Irish vote could be 
affected by nationalist migration to the North. Given the openness of the Irish border, there 
is a, albeit rather minimal, risk that persons of more extreme political views will attempt to 
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affect referendum results by casting their vote on the opposing side of the border. This 
history of political tension is a sufficient local circumstance189 to justify the imposition of 
an ordinary residence requirement, so that a person who has been residing in either Ireland 
or the North for an agreed period of time will have their vote counted in that territory, 
regardless of which side of the border they are on come polling day. 
(d) The required threshold 
As to the imposition of a threshold which must be met to ensure territorial change, a 
simple majority threshold is appropriate. Although State practice does not set a defined 
threshold which must be met,190 thresholds of more than a mere majority are 
permissible,191 although not advisable.192 However, the Agreement, and the Northern 
Ireland Act, are not silent on the threshold which must be met: both state that territorial 
change will occur if a “majority” of voters favour it.193 This shows that it is envisaged in 
the Agreement that a simple majority of the Northern and Republic votes would be a 
sufficient indication of the free will of the people so as to change Northern Ireland’s status. 
The imposition of a higher threshold, as occurred in Montenegro,194 would be contrary to 
the Agreement. 
(e) The question 
Finally, the question must also be determined. In order to meet the requirements of clarity 
and unambiguity,195 the question posed on both sides of the border should be identical. As 
the Scottish referendum question196 was so “exemplary in its clarity”,197 it is proposed that 
the Scottish question be adapted so as to fit the Irish context, the suggested question being 
“Should Northern Ireland form part of a united Ireland?”  
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2 The Referendum 
Two key issues will need to be addressed in relation to the actual referendum process: the 
first being the role of the States; the second the role of international observation. 
(a) The role of the States 
States should generally restrain from excessively campaigning for one outcome in a 
referendum.198 The UK has stated that it has “no selfish strategic or economic interest in 
Northern Ireland”,199 and the Agreement states in terms that it is for the “people of the 
island of Ireland alone… without external impediment” to determine Northern Ireland’s 
status.200 The implication of this is that both States should refrain from excessive 
campaigning in favour of one result or the other. 
However, the role of Ireland is more complex. Although the UK has declared it has no 
interest in Northern Ireland’s status,201 Ireland has historically pursued a claim to it, in 
both the international202 and municipal spheres.203 These claims, rather than being 
political, were legal. There was a “constitutional imperative” to seek unification.204 
Although Ireland’s constitution was amended under the Multi-Party Agreement so as to 
not make such claims,205 it has been argued that the constitutional imperative to seek 
unification remains.206 Were this the case, the Irish government’s role during the 
referendum would be mandated by this constitutional imperative, as well as international 
law.  
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However, this proposition cannot be sustained. The Agreement specifically vests the future 
of the territory in the hands of the people,207 not in either State. On a constitutional level, 
the Irish people are the source from whom the State’s power is derived, and it is the 
people’s right “to decide all questions of national policy”,208 not the right of the State. 
Taken together, these provisions imply that Ireland has not only withdrawn her legal claim 
of right to the North, but also that she is no longer under a constitutional imperative to seek 
unification. To hold otherwise would be to use any referendum as a political instrument, 
which would be impermissible209 and contrary to good faith. 
(b) International observation 
The second key issue to be resolved is the role of international observation. Northern 
Ireland has been beseeched by conflict for most of its existence. Tensions and distrust 
remain high within the territory.210 Given this, impartial international observation and 
monitoring, conducted by either the EU or United Nations, will help to ensure the results 
are open, free and trusted.211  
V Post-Referendum 
There are three possible results to any self-determination in Ireland: first, a majority in 
Northern Ireland vote for the retention of Northern Ireland’s current status; second, the 
island of Ireland is divided, in that the Northern Irish majority supports a united Ireland, 
whereas Republic voters do not; and third, a majority on both sides of the border vote in 
favour of a united Ireland. Each of these possible outcomes has different legal 
ramifications. In other words, the effects of Irish self-determination depends on the 
outcome of any future referendum.  
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A A United Kingdom 
Should a majority vote to retain ties with the UK, there shall be no change in the status of 
Northern Ireland.212 This does not mean, however, that the obligations to respect the right 
to self-determination will cease. The unionist and nationalist populations remain ‘people’ 
entitled to the customary protections of internal self-determination. The UK remains under 
an obligation to respect this right, which encompasses the pursuit of political participation 
within the State.213  
In Northern Ireland, internal self-determination is crucial. Although Northern Ireland is not 
a colony in a legal sense, the nationalist population within the territory have still 
experienced many of the negative effects traditionally associated with colonialism, such as 
marginalisation, discrimination, cultural alienation and social disadvantage.214 Whilst the 
devolved government now in place in Northern Ireland goes a long way to remedy this,215 
it is crucial that the right to internal self-determination continues to play a role in 
government and discourse. 
B A Divided Ireland 
If the Republic votes in favour of unity, but the North does not, there shall be no change in 
Northern Ireland’s status.216 The same is true in the unlikely event that Northern Ireland 
supports a united Ireland, but the Irish electorate does not. The right to external self-
determination in the Agreement is limited to a right to retain the status quo or form a 
united Ireland. Solutions such as independence or joint sovereignty are indirectly ruled 
out.217 Such a result is not unprecedented. In the Northern Cameroons case, the 
International Court of Justice observed that where a referendum envisages only two 
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possible results, with there having been no prior discussion of a third possible outcome, it 
is “indisputable” that third options cannot be achieved.218 
C A United Ireland 
The effects of a vote in favour of a united Ireland, on the other hand, are more complex. In 
this case, both governments are obliged to introduce legislation to enable a united 
Ireland.219 Should the people of the island of Ireland vote for this option, many issues of 
law will arise. 
1 Statehood 
One of the key areas of concern in the exercise of external self-determination is the effects 
this has on international legal personality. In the context of the 2014 Scottish referendum, 
major scholarship was done on this matter.220 
Fortunately, such issues are simpler to resolve in relation to Ireland. Whereas the Scottish 
referendum concerned State creation,221 the Belfast Agreement concerns the transfer of 
territory from one State to another. This means that issues of personality are unlikely to 
arise. Mere territorial change does not affect the international personality of States,222 a 
point relevantly demonstrated by the fact that Ireland’s independence did not change the 
UK’s international status.223  
2 International Organisations 
The continuing international personality of both States means that membership of 
international organisations, such as the UN, will be unaffected. Likewise, EU rights and 
obligations will continue unimpeded. The EU does not define the scope of a State’s 
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territory.224 Although the EU is a “new legal order of international law”,225 it remains 
bound by custom,226 under which the Statehood of both Ireland and the UK would 
continue.227 Therefore, provided the proposed referendum on continued UK membership 
in the EU228 does not result in withdrawal, the exercise of self-determination will not cause 
difficulties as to EU rights and obligations. 
3 The Continuation of the Agreement 
Of major significance is the effect that the creation of a united Ireland would have on the 
continuity of the Belfast Agreement. There are contending views on this matter. On one 
hand, the Agreement has been described as a transitional, rather than final, settlement,229 
the implication being that the Agreement would not continue post-unity. On the other 
hand, it has also been argued that the Agreement’s provisions will continue indefinitely.230 
The resolution of this issue is of crucial importance. If the Agreement would continue in 
force, the obligations of the Irish State would include a continuation, in some form or 
another, of the Agreement’s devolved government structure. 
The Agreement would remain in force in a united Ireland. There is no sunset clause in the 
Agreement, and the plain wording of the text implies that it is intended to continue 
regardless of the North’s territorial status. The Agreement states that “whatever choice is 
freely exercised by a majority of the people of Northern Ireland”, government there is 
obliged to exercise jurisdiction impartially.231 This creates an obligation that is clearly 
intended to continue even in the event of a united Ireland. This intent is also shown 
through the fact that the Agreement confers on the people of Northern Ireland a right to 
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Irish and British identity and citizenship, regardless of the North’s status.232 As such, 
unless the parties agree to terminate the Agreement by consent,233 the Agreement would 
remain in force. 
4 State Restructuring 
The fact that the Agreement will continue in force means that there would be an obligation 
on Ireland to continue a regional government, for her sovereignty over her territory would 
be limited by the treaty.234 Scholars have proposed that a federal Northern Irish State 
within a united Ireland would be an appropriate solution to alleviate concerns about power 
imbalances.235 If the Agreement would continue in force, a devolved regime of this 
manner is not merely good policy, but legally imperative.236 
Even if the Agreement does not continue, or is terminated, a federal Northern Irish State is 
an appropriate means by which to protect internal self-determination. The regional 
distribution of governmental power in federal systems237 means that the right to internal 
self-determination can be readily fulfilled within them.238 As federal systems encourage 
greater participation in government decisions within minority populations,239 such an 
approach would have significant merit in a united Ireland. 
5 Continued UK Involvement 
Should a united Ireland eventuate, this does not mean that the role of the UK in the North 
will cease. It will be continued in at least two ways, both of which will ensure that the 
interests of unionists are aptly protected. 
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First, the Agreement creates cross-border bodies and forums, which allow the discussion 
of matters of mutual concern.240 As the Agreement will continue in force, these entities, 
too, will continue to exist. 
Second, the people of Northern Ireland will remain entitled to British citizenship.241 States 
have a right to invoke the responsibility of another State for wrongful acts done to one of 
their nationals.242 Theoretically, the UK could therefore invoke the responsibility of 
Ireland for any violations of the right to self-determination, or other fundamental rights, of 
unionists therein.  
The difficulty with this is that the people of Northern Ireland are dual nationals. A State 
may invoke diplomatic protection against another State of nationality only where the 
former State is the State of predominant nationality.243 There is no set criteria for what 
determines the predominant nationality, the assessment is largely circumstantial.244  
Even if it could not be shown that a person is predominantly of British nationality, the role 
that inter-State applications before the Strasbourg Court have played in allowing 
diplomatic protection of a form must be noted. When it was alleged that the UK was 
torturing nationalist prisoners, Ireland brought a case before the Court, and had some 
limited success in holding the UK accountable.245 As withheld evidence emerged, the 
matter will be reheard in Strasbourg, again on Ireland’s initiative,246 thus indicating that 
mechanisms of some effect for State accountability do exist.  
Where a right to diplomatic protection exists, there is also a common law duty on the 
Crown to exercise it in certain circumstances. Although there is no international obligation 
to pursue diplomatic protection,247 the Crown owes a duty of protection to its citizens,248 
from which stems an obligation on the Crown to consider undertaking diplomatic 
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protection,249 enforceable by judicial review.250 That said, the executive retains a high 
degree of discretion as to the exercise or non-exercise of diplomatic protection.251 
VI The Wider Implications of the Belfast Agreement 
The discussion of the Belfast Agreement thus far has focused on the interpretation of the 
Agreement in light of the general law of self-determination. However, the Agreement, as a 
piece of State practice, may also impact the general law of self-determination.  
It is oft-stated that Northern Ireland is exceptional. Although this argument has been 
convincingly rejected, 252 there remains an exceptional innovation within the Agreement, 
in its mixing of international and constitutional law, so as to accommodate two competing 
self-determination goals. 253  
Particularly innovative is the role that various actors have had, and will have, under the 
Agreement. To date, State practice has recognised that there is an obligation for States to 
enter into good faith negotiations with each other with regards to referenda in territories 
over which they both have a claim.254 Customary international law also establishes an 
obligation on States to enter into negotiations with a territory wishing to become 
independent.255 The Belfast Agreement, however, was reached by a mixture of both of 
these. The right to self-determination truly was given to the people, as it was the people 
themselves who determined the scope of their right, with the consent of both States. By 
recognising the legitimacy of nationalist and unionist aspirations, and forfeiting any vested 
interests in Northern Ireland, the UK and Ireland have created a settlement to a long and 
bitter conflict. Whilst the peace is uneasy and imperfect, few would deny that it is an 
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improvement to the conflict years. Should this approach be adopted elsewhere, it could 
have a significant impact on the way in which self-determination is realised in post-
conflict contexts.  
Secession movements remain prevalent around the world, the Crimean crisis being the 
obvious example. Aside from the flaws in the Crimean referendum which have been 
already been noted, a comparison of the Belfast and Crimean mechanisms highlights the 
merits of the Belfast approach to self-determination. At a basic level, the two situations 
have similarities: two neighbouring States with historic and present interests in a territory, 
in which there are competing nationalist and unionist movements. Had the two 
governments involved in Crimea, particularly Russia, followed the approach adopted 
under the Belfast Agreement, the free will of the territory’s people, on which Russia 
placed so much importance,256 could have been properly obtained. 
Given the reluctance of States to forfeit their territorial integrity, to expect such a result is 
idealistic. However, if States are prepared to do so, the people truly become the “masters 
of the country”,257 and the people “determine the destiny of the territory”,258 rather than 
having their destiny determined by it. The Belfast Agreement is a testament to this. 
VII Conclusion 
The Belfast Agreement is outstanding for having ushered in a new era of peace in Northern 
Ireland. Although recent events have highlighted the fragility of this peace,259 the 
Agreement has survived such difficulties before. Provided the parties recall their firm 
commitment to non-violence, and are resolved to act in good faith towards each other, 
such difficulties can undoubtedly be overcome again. 
Through its provisions on self-determination, the Agreement recognises the legitimacy of 
conflicting aspirations as to Northern Ireland’s status. Although ambiguous in parts, the 
Agreement, being a creature of the law, must be interpreted in light of it, which enables the 
resolution of any issues which may arise. 
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Although the Belfast Agreement has made significant advances in the context of Irish self-
determination, its innovative approach is also more widely significant. The Agreement 
stands testimony to what may be achieved when States forfeit their interests, and work 
alongside, not against, conflicting self-determination aspirations. Far from being 
applicable merely in Ireland, the principles and mechanisms underpinning the Agreement 
serve as a model by which secessionist disputes may be resolved in post-conflict 
territories. The Agreement, therefore, will remain significant in the future, whether or not a 
future referendum results in a united Ireland. 
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